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NOTES AND COMMENTS
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS: SURETY'S RIGHT OR RISK?

It is unquestioned law that a debtor who makes a payment to a
creditor to whom he owes several debts may direct to which of them
his payment shall be applied., In the absence of direction, the choice
of application usually lies with the creditor. 2 If such choice is exercised by neither, the law will direct that the payment should be
applied as most befits the equities of the situation.3 As between such
parties, the rules applied are eminently just. When, however, a third
person is introduced into the situation, as, for example, a surety
upon one of the debts thus owed, the added complexity generates a
problem which has found no simple or uniform answer, and over
which the law still seems in a state of flux.
A simple illustration of how such problem is apt to arise may
help serve to crystallize any discussion of the subject. C, a materialman, furnishes materials to D, a contractor, on job No. 1, performance and payment of which is not bonded. C thereafter furnishes
more materials to D to be used on another job, No. 2, which is bonded
by S, the surety. C's bill for materials in each instance is $1,000
and both bills remain unpaid. D finally makes a payment of $1,000
from funds earned on job No. 2, but gives no instruction as to how
this payment shall be applied. C applies it to satisfy the bill incurred on job No. 1 and thereafter seeks to hold S, on the bond, for
charges growing out of the second job. S maintains that C was
bound to apply the payment toward reduction of the bonded debt
inasmuch as the funds were derived from that project. Had D made
such direction, S's contention would be sound. Since D did not, C
urges that he has the right to determine the application of the fund
but S responds that if no direction was made then an equity arose
in his, S's, favor to have the fund applied to extinguish the secured
obligation inasmuch as the same originated from that source. S's
contention is met by C's claim that (1) he did not know the source
of the fund; (2) that knowing the source, he was not obliged to
recognize any superior equity as no trust was involved and he should
not be placed in any worse position than an entirely disconnected
creditor who would not have to disgorge; or (3) that S assumed
the risk that funds arising from the secured obligation might be
used by D to satisfy his personal and unsecured debts.'
'Griff v. Fox, 204 Ill. App. 598 (1917).
2 Illinois Refining Co. v. Welch, 341 IMI. 292, 173 N. E. 345 (1930).
3United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 6 L. Ed. 199 (1824);
Wilhelm v. Schmidt, 84 Ill. 183 (1876).
4 A variety of other situations may develop, but the illustration given will
serve as an example of the basic problem involved.
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The diversity of answers which may be given to such problem
may best be illustrated by two sample cases. In the Illinois case
of Alexander Lumber Company v. Aetna Accident & Liability Company,5 the court held that inasmuch as the creditor had a fair idea
as to the source of the fund a "special equity" arose in favor of the
surety, hence the fund had to be applied toward the reduction of
the secured debt.0 At the opposite extreme is the Minnesota case of
Standard Oil Company v. Day 7 where it was determined that even
though the creditor knew the source of the fund he was, nevertheless, free to make such application as he saw fit. The claim of right
or equity in favor of the surety was answered by the court in the
following language: "Where the bond is furnished the surety must
recognize the possible occurrence of what here did occur as one of
the perils of its business. In other words one who becomes surety
takes the risk that honest payment of unsecured debts may leave a
deficiency which the surety must make good." 8
If the creditor has no knowledge of the source of the fund it is,
perhaps, well that he should be left free to make his own application
thereof for, as was said in Salt Lake City v. O'Connor," "Money released into trade should be permitted to circulate freely, unburdened
by hidden equities or liens." The surety who permits such circulation can be said to have no greater equity than the creditor who
receives it, hence the legal rights of the latter ought, perhaps, prevail.'0 In the other situations, however, no such consideration should
be deemed controlling for the equities are not hidden from the creditor, but his claim rests upon a direct contradiction of known equities.
Despite this, the courts are not agreed upon the point that the
surety is entitled, as a matter of equity and conscience, to require
the application of proceeds derived from the secured claim toward
the extinguishment of the secured debt. Cases which do so hold
consider that the intervention of a third party in the situation
prevents the application of the general rule." They, therefore, grant
5 296 Ill. 500, 129 N. E. 871 (1921), noted in 30 Yale L. J. 766.
6 296 Il.

500 at 505, 129 N. E. 871 at 873.
noted in 25 Col. L. Rev. 679 and 38
Harv. L. Rev. 990.
8 161 Minn. 281 at 286, 201 N. W. 410 at 412.
9 68 Utah 233 at 242, -249 P. 810 at 814, 49 A. L. R. 941 at 947 (1926).
10 B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52, 158 P. 740,
L. R. A. 1917C 630 (1916). There are cases to the contrary, however, for
absence of knowledge did not prevent the court from requiring application of
the payment to the secured claim in Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 227 F.
780 (1915), and Sioux City Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Merten, 174 Iowa 332, 156
N. W. 367, L. R. A. 1916D 1247 (1916).
11 R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 112 F. (2d) 150 (1940);
United States v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, 67 F. (2d) 121 (1933); Columbia
Digger Co. v. Sparks, 227 F. 780 (1915); United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Butcher, 223 Ala. 606, 137 So. 446 (1931); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dupree, 223 Ala. 420, 136 So. 811 (1931); Alexander Lumber Co. v. Aetna Accident &
Liability Ins. Co., 296 Ill. 500, 129 N. E. 871 (1921), dictum; Sipes v. Ardmore
Book & News Co., 138 Okla. 180, 280 P. 805 (1929).
7 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410 (1924),
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to the known surety the equitable right to compel application of
the fund toward his exoneration even though the debtor did not see
fit to require it. The leading case for the opposite view, that of
People for the use of Hirth v. Powers,1 2 instead bases its holding
on the fact that there is no privity of contract between the creditor
and the surety so as to require the former to apply the fund to
benefit the latter. In the absence of any provision in the contract
between them which requires that the earnings of the debtor under
the secured contract shall be devoted to the satisfaction of the
secured liability, the court therein felt that the debtor was free to
apply his earnings as he saw fit.
The view of that case has found a welcome echo among the
writings of certain of the standard authorities, 13 particularly since
no express trust in such funds is created for the surety's benefit
in the absence of express provision to that end. But a special equity
should not be hard to find if the principal debtor and the creditor
collude on the point, as their action then would clearly amount to
a fraud on the surety from which equity certainly should relieve.
When it is remembered that construction bonds with surety are
usually sought so as to make resort to lien statutes unnecessary, the
conduct of the creditor who applies the proceeds from the secured
contract toward the satisfaction of an unsecured claim, thereby preserving to himself the benefits of the lien statute, is scarcely less
reprehensible than that of one who colludes with the debtor to prejudice the position of the surety. A gross injustice may not be tantamount to a fraud, but equity is competent to relieve from either.
The third of the creditor's contentions, i. e., that the surety
assumed the risk, is one that has also met with some success before
the courts, particularly where the surety was a paid one. 14 Such a
holding might well be justified where the creditor is entirely unconnected with the guaranteed contract for to hold otherwise would
be protecting a surety who has been indifferent toward providing
his own protection.' 5 When, however, the creditor knows of the
existence of the surety and knows the source of the fund the situation is different, for the conscience of the ordinary man would
dictate that the money should be applied to extinguish the debt
from whence such fund arose. It begs the question to say that the
surety should have prevented such payment by demanding control
12108 Mich. 339, 66 N. W. 215 (1896).
'3 See Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., §1806; Arant, Hornbook of the Law of
Suretyship and Guaranty (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1931), p. 344. See also note
in 27 Mich. L. Rev. 686, which supplements a note in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 556,
where the cases on the subject are cataloged effectively. Annotations may also
be found in L. R. A. 1916D 1254, L. R. A. 1917C 637, 21 A. L. R. 704, 49
A L. R. 941, and 60 A. L. R. 203.
14 City of Marshfield v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 128 Ore. 547,
274 P. 503 (1929); Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer, 104 Ind. App.
219, 10 N. E. (2d) 440 (1937).
15 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Union State Bank, 21 F. (2d) 102 (1927).
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over the fund as a price to becoming surety." It is likewise beside
the point as to whether or not the surety is a "paid" one, for even
a compensated surety has rights before the law. The fundamental
fact remains that the creditor who makes such an application of
payment in derogation of the rights of the surety is acting inequitably and should be held to account.
The modern trend, if there is one, seems to be against the compensated surety unless he can show an actual fraud on his rights.
Some indication of a change may be seen in more recent federal
cases, 17 but until the state courts return to fundamental principles
of justice in this regard, the law will remain in a state of confusion. 18
D. A. ESLIN

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF TAXPA ,CERS
-WHETHER TAXPAYER MUST MAKE DEMAND UPON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT IN ITS NAME AND
ON ITS BEHALF-The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
recently had occasion to consider, in People ex rel. City of Chicago
v. Schreiber,' the circumstances under which a taxpayer might bring
suit in the name of and on behalf of a municipal corporation against
a public officer to recover funds allegedly improperly retained by
the latter.2 A prior suit had been filed by a taxpayer to compel an
accounting of such money and it was his contention that since his
suit had been filed first, it was a bar to a subsequent mandamus
- In Salt Lake City v. O'Co~ior, 68 Utah 233 at 242, 249 P. 810 at 814
(1926), however, the court said: "When a surety . . . permits money on the
contract to be paid the contractor unconditionally, which it must know he may
use for general purposes, we see no sufficient reason for sustaining any claim
or equity in behalf of the surety, in such money, after it has been paid to
another in the due course of business. The risk of such loss is one of the hazards which the surety, for a fixed consideration, assumes by its contract." See
also Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410, 41 A. L. R. 1291
(1924); Grover v. Board of Education, 102 N. J. Eq. 415, 141 A. 81 (1928),
affirmed in 104 N. J. Eq. 197, 144 A. 918 (1929); Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v.
Ortman, 190 Mich. 429, 157 N. W. 96 (1916).
17 In Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of South Norfolk, 54 F. (2d) 1032 (1932),
the court permitted the creditor to apply. the fund as he saw fit. One year
later, in United States v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, 67 F.. (2d) 121 at 123
(1933), the same court declared that where payment is made to the creditor
with the "identical money for the payment of which the surety is bound" such
fund must go toward the extinguishment of the secured debt.
Is Although the federal courts may formulate their own rules as to bonds
on federal contracts, they must still be guided by state decisions on state
matters by reason of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.
Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
1322 Ill. App. 452, 54 N. E. (2d) 862 (1944).
2It appeared that a city clerk had collected fees for issuing state fishing and
hunting licenses and had retained a portion of the amounts collected as a commission which, it was contended, should have been turned over to the city
treasury. The court held that the sums so retained were not fees and earnings
of the city clerk under fll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §172, but belonged to the
official in his private capacity.

